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Abstract. Tort law contains multiple doctrines governing the assignment of liability and
the calculation of damages. But in what sequence should courts apply these doctrines? Does
it matter, for example, whether a court applies comparative fault before or after
mitigation of damages? The answer, rather surprisingly, is that sequencing does matter,
and it can substantially affect the compensation that a tort victim ultimately receives. Yet
the existing case law on sequencing is ad hoc, inconsistent, and undertheorized, and the
issue has been entirely overlooked by the academic literature.
In this Article, we introduce and examine the question of sequencing. We offer three
contexts in which the question arises in torts: failures to mitigate, damage caps, and
collateral sources of funding. All of these contexts play a major role in determining
liability and compensation, yet each demonstrates a different way in which attention to
sequencing can improve legal analysis. Building on these examples, we develop a general
theory of damages sequencing.
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Introduction
Back in algebra class, all of us encountered the “order of operations,” the
mathematical convention stating which operations take precedence in a
calculation.1 Some may even remember the mnemonic “Please Excuse My Dear
Aunt Sally,” which reminds us that (P)arentheses are first, followed by
(E)xponents, then (M)ultiplication and (D)ivision, and finally (A)ddition and
(S)ubtraction. The fundamental idea behind the order of operations is simple:
The sequence of calculations matters. If you perform subtraction before
multiplication, you will get a different value than when you perform
multiplication before subtraction.
But what does the order of operations have to do with law? While at first
sight this mathematical concept may seem unrelated to legal thinking, the
question of sequencing is in fact fundamental to how the legal system calculates
damages. Failing to account for the order of operations—or more precisely,
failing to consider the proper sequence of calculations—often leads courts into
trouble. Take, for example, Williams v. Jader Fuel Co. 2 In Williams, the Seventh
Circuit faced a tricky damage calculation and attempted to offer the following
instructive example:
[A] plaintiff who suffers $100,000 in damages because of an automobile accident
for which he was forty-five percent at fault would recover $55,000. If the jury
were also to conclude that the plaintiff ’s failure promptly to seek medical
attention following the accident—perhaps the prototypical example of a failure to
mitigate damages—was the cause of $15,000 of his injuries, it would reduce the
award to $40,000.3

Straightforward, right? Far from it. This sequence is wrong as a matter of
logic. If the plaintiff’s failure to seek medical attention caused an additional
$15,000 in injuries, then the original, jointly caused accident involved only
$85,000 in damages. Splitting this figure 55–45 based on comparative fault
yields a reduced award of $46,750, not $40,000. The Seventh Circuit performed
the multiplication for comparative fault before the subtraction for failure to
mitigate. It should have done the subtraction before the multiplication. Any
court following the Seventh Circuit’s example would therefore shortchange
the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit is not alone in making this kind of
sequencing error. As we discuss below, many courts have made this exact error
when accounting for failures to mitigate. Furthermore, the problem of
1. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACS. & COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCH.

OFFICERS, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS
https://perma.cc/XNB2-9YMD.
2. 944 F.2d 1388 (7th Cir. 1991).
3. Id. at 1402.
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sequencing is much broader than the mistake made in Williams. The problem
arises whenever courts face multiple steps in calculating damages. For
example, should damage caps be applied before or after the reduction for
comparative fault? What about collateral sources—third parties who have paid
the plaintiff for an injury or the costs of injury? When do (and how should)
they figure into the damage calculation?
Court behavior related to sequencing tends to be ad hoc and inconsistent.
Sometimes, courts unwittingly follow precedent from other contexts but fail
to see that context changes the appropriate sequence. Sometimes they
incorrectly take their cues from the structure of trial, in which liability issues
(for example, comparative fault) precede damages issues (for example, failures
to mitigate and damage caps). Sometimes they seek precision in statutory
language where none can be found. And sometimes, we suspect, courts simply
forget that the order of operations matters.
But the order of operations can matter a lot. Courts and scholars spend
countless hours developing principles to ensure accuracy and precision in legal
outcomes. Yet courts’ improper sequencing at the end can easily undo all of the
effort that precedes it. Remarkably, this issue has escaped focused scholarly
attention.4
In this Article, we investigate the problem of sequencing. We offer three
contexts in which the problem arises in torts: failures to mitigate, damage caps,
and collateral sources of funding. Each of these examples demonstrates a
different way in which attention to sequencing can improve legal analysis, and
through careful examination we provide new insights on the proper sequence
in all three contexts. Together, the three examples also enable us to develop an
overall theory of sequencing, which can help courts and scholars address the
sequencing problem generally.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses failures to mitigate, also
known as the “doctrine of avoidable consequences.” Here, confusion reigns
among courts, but as we show, attention to sequencing can help establish a
uniform (and correct) procedure.
4. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 385-

91, 404-08 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing comparative negligence and mitigation of damages
but not their proper sequence); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 86-94 (5th ed. 2019) (noting the
resemblance between comparative fault and mitigation but not considering their
interaction in a single fact pattern); see also JAMES EDELMAN, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES
225-26 (20th ed. 2018); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 334-52, 807-08 (12th ed. 2020); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L.
RABIN, MICHAEL D. GREEN, MARK A. GEISTFELD & NORA FREEMAN ENGSTROM, TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 449-74 (11th ed. 2021); 4 FOWLER V.
HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS 57885 (3d ed. 2007).
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Part II considers damage caps of various kinds—not only the controversial
noneconomic damage caps that are most salient today, but also less explored
damage caps associated with government entities and charitable organizations.
The case law on damage caps exhibits considerable uniformity, but an
examination of sequencing reveals that courts could have reached a different,
but equally legitimate, sequencing rule for caps. Which rule one chooses
depends on one’s theoretical view of caps, as well as one’s policy preferences.
Part III analyzes how the law accounts for collateral sources given the
abolition of the common law’s collateral-source rule. Here, courts are split on
the appropriate procedure. Paying attention to sequencing enables us not only
to explain this split, but also to realize that both extant rules are in tension
with basic tenets of tort law. In response, we propose a novel, alternative rule
to account for collateral sources.
Based on these three examples, Part IV takes a broader view of the
sequencing problem. It first investigates and explains why courts make
sequencing errors. It then considers the various costs—both to individuals and
to society—associated with the confusion over sequencing. In addition to
raising fairness concerns, miscalculating damages can exacerbate existing
inequities and interfere with proper incentives. Part IV finally brings some
much-needed clarity to this messy area of the law. It develops a conceptual
framework for thinking about the sequencing problem and proposes an “order
of operations” for calculating damages in the legal context.
I.

Mitigation

The doctrine of mitigation, which diminishes recovery based on the
failure to mitigate avoidable harm, plays an important role in tort litigation.
Whether the case involves medical malpractice, a slip-and-fall, or a defective
product, how the victim behaves after the accident and whether the victim
seeks proper medical treatment can have a sizable impact on the ultimate
harm. Similarly, in many property-harm cases, victims may reduce losses after
an accident by replacing the damaged property, repairing it, or switching to a
substitute. Because victims (just like injurers) do not always behave reasonably,
cases involving claims of victims’ failures to mitigate are commonplace.5
5. Of course, failure to mitigate is but one way in which a victim’s unreasonable behavior

can contribute to the realization of harm. Victims can also behave unreasonably prior
to the harm by failing to take adequate care. One might therefore guess that interplay
between the rules regulating victim fault (before and after the harm) would frequently
arise. Yet such interactions are of a modern vintage. Victim duty to take care before
harm has traditionally been subject to the doctrine of contributory negligence, which
barred a victim’s claim entirely whenever he failed to take adequate precautions. Under
that rule, if a victim behaved unreasonably before harm occurred, his claim would be
denied, and the doctrine of mitigation would not come into play. The two doctrines
footnote continued on next page
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As we already saw in Williams, when both comparative fault and
mitigation apply, a sequencing problem emerges. Suppose a victim suffers
$100,000 in injuries from a car accident. A jury finds the victim and the injurer
equally at fault for the accident, but the jury also finds that the victim could
have avoided $20,000 of the injuries if she had sought proper medical treatment
immediately afterward. How much should the victim recover? That is, should a
court apply comparative fault or the mitigation doctrine first?
In this context, the correct sequence is to apply the reduction for failure to
mitigate first and then apply comparative fault. The reason is that comparative
fault operates on the amount of joint harm. Harm created by the victim’s failure
to mitigate is attributable to the victim alone, so it should be set aside before
the court applies comparative fault. Thus, in this hypothetical, the joint harm
is $100k – $20k = $80k. That amount is then divided 50–50 for comparative
fault, yielding a recovery of $40,000. Reversing the order would yield a
recovery of only $30,000,6 shortchanging the victim $10,000. In other words,
applying comparative fault before the doctrine of mitigation overcharges the
victim. While the victim’s failure to mitigate accounts for $20,000 of her
injuries, the reverse sequence effectively charges her $30,000.
Applying comparative fault prior to mitigation can lead to absurd results
in some situations. Suppose in the hypothetical above that the victim’s failure
to mitigate accounted for $60,000 (rather than $20,000) of her injuries. Applied
first, comparative fault would reduce the injurer’s liability to $50,000. Further
reduction for failure to mitigate would then lead the victim to owe $10,000 to
the injurer (or, at the very least, drop her damages to zero). This result is
clearly erroneous considering that the injurer is responsible for 50% of the
initial harm of $40,000.
Unfortunately, like the Seventh Circuit in Williams, many courts have
incorrectly sequenced comparative fault and mitigation—at considerable cost
to victims. The mistaken sequence can be found in cases involving different
types of harm (bodily injury, property damage, pure economic loss) and
different forms of mitigation (neglecting to obtain medical treatment, failing
to perform an alternative transaction). Consider Truck Insurance Exchange v.
Sullivan, Kelly & Associates, a case involving professional malpractice.7 There, a
California appellate court affirmed the reduction of the cross-complainant’s
were therefore mutually exclusive. Things have changed as jurisdictions have
increasingly abandoned contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault. In
comparative fault jurisdictions, because a victim’s inadequate care no longer functions
as a complete bar, it does not preclude the applicability of the mitigation doctrine. See
generally, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., supra note 4, at 384-86 (discussing the shift to comparative
fault).
6. ($100k * 50%) – $20k = $30k.
7. No. D036534, 2002 WL 273826, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002).
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$2.35 million in damages by 40% for comparative fault before subtracting the
$440,000 “attributable to [the cross-complainant’s] failure to mitigate.”8 This
sequencing error shortchanged the cross-complainant by over $175,000.9 In
Hattem v. Smith, the plaintiff suffered $318,000 in damages as a result of legal
malpractice.10 The trial court reduced the plaintiff’s recovery by 35% for
comparative fault, then subtracted $90,000 for failure to mitigate.11 This
sequencing error shortchanged the plaintiff by over $30,000.12 Interestingly,
the Hattem court praised the trial court’s erroneous method even though
language in the jury verdict form suggested that the mitigation reduction
should have taken place first.13
Plaintiffs sometimes do not even realize that a sequencing error has
occurred. Consider Gomez v. American Empress Partnership, a case ultimately
heard by the Ninth Circuit.14 In Gomez, the trial court erroneously applied
comparative fault before reducing the award for failure to mitigate.15 Yet the
8. Id. at *2. For an additional example, see Center Court Associates v. Maitland/Strauss &

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

Behr, No. CV-86-252381, 1994 WL 185595, at *50 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 1994)
(reducing approximately $350,000 in damages by 33.3% for comparative fault before
subtracting approximately $60,000 for the plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate, shortchanging
the plaintiffs around $20,000). But see, e.g., 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 110.31.01.02 note on use (7th ed. 2019) (“[T]he
verdict form should instruct the jury to reduce the amount of the plaintiff ’s damages
by whatever amount of such damage is attributed to the failure to mitigate. The
apportionment of fault is then applied to the amount of damages specified in the jury’s
answer on the verdict form.”).
The court calculated the cross-complainant’s recovery to be ($2.35m * 60%) – $440k =
$970k. In reality, the cross-complainant’s recovery should have been ($2.35m – $440k) *
60% = $1.146m.
52 N.Y.S.3d 172, 174 (App. Div. 2017).
Id. at 174, 176.
The court calculated the plaintiff ’s recovery to be ($318k * 65%) – $90k = $116,700. In
reality, the plaintiff ’s recovery should have been ($318k – $90k) * 65% = $148,200.
Compare Hattem, 52 N.Y.S.3d at 176 (“[The] Supreme Court was lastly correct to issue a
judgment that subtracted $90,000 from the already apportioned damages instead of vice
versa, as doing otherwise would have disregarded the distinction between awarding
those damages that flow from a defendant’s negligent conduct and reducing set
damages that would have been lower but for the subsequent unreasonable conduct of a
plaintiff . . . .”), with Joint Record on Appeal at 811, Hattem, 52 N.Y.S.3d 172 (No. 523068)
(asking the jury by how much the total damages should “be reduced, because of [the
plaintiff ’s] unreasonable/imprudent actions”). At least with respect to the seatbelt
defense, New York case law establishes the correct sequence. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411
practice cmt. C1411:1 (MCKINNEY 2021) (noting that damages should be reduced by
harm due to the plaintiff ’s failure to wear a seatbelt before the application of
comparative fault). Having the correct guidance in that context, however, did not
guarantee correct implementation in Hattem.
No. 97-35932, 1999 WL 595330 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1999).
Id. at *2. Concluding that the plaintiff had suffered $100,000 in damages ($50,000
economic and $50,000 noneconomic), the trial court found that the plaintiff was 75% at
footnote continued on next page
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plaintiff did not even argue the sequencing issue on appeal, and instead made a
specious argument trying to separate economic from noneconomic damages.16
The Ninth Circuit briefly remarked on the sequencing issue in dicta,
commenting that “[t]here is something to be said for [the] contrary approach”
of accounting for failure to mitigate first.17 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
declined to find plain error,18 citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Williams
as persuasive authority and drawing a questionable analogy to the collateralsource doctrine.19
One curious aspect of this sequencing problem is that some courts seem to
calculate damages correctly by accident. In some jurisdictions, jurors are asked
to account for a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate through a percentage reduction
rather than with a specific value.20 This method is likely used for several
reasons. For one, percentages may be a more natural reduction method for
noneconomic damages like pain and suffering, where there is no precise
numerical amount attributable to a failure to mitigate. Additionally, since
comparative fault operates via percentages, juries may find it easier to use a
similar format for mitigation. In any event, using a percentage reduction
(rather than a specific value) fortuitously eliminates the sequencing problem.
Since percentage reductions involve multiplication, and since multiplication is
commutative and associative (that is, the order in which one carries out
multiplication does not matter), sequencing becomes irrelevant.
For example, in Sawicki v. New Britain General Hospital, the court reduced
the plaintiff’s $6.9 million in damages by 50% for comparative fault and then

16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

fault and could have avoided 25% of the damages with proper mitigation. The trial
court first applied comparative fault, reducing the recovery to $100k * 25% = $25k, and
then reduced it by a further $25,000 for failure to mitigate, arriving at zero recovery.
As we have established, this is the wrong sequence. Subtracting the failure to mitigate
first, we determine that the jointly caused damage was $75,000. The plaintiff should
therefore have recovered $75k * 25% = $18,750.
See id.
Id.
Id. (“But Mr. Gomez has not provided authority for this result, or made it clear whether
we review for clear error, abuse of discretion, or de novo regarding the mode of
calculation. In light of the reasonableness of the approach to calculation taken by the
district judge, and the authority for it, we are unable to characterize the mode of
calculation as error.”). We would argue, however, that improper sequencing is indeed
plain error: Proper sequencing is a matter of logic, not policy.
Id. at *2 & nn.7-8 (mentioning Williams and characterizing Johnson v. United States, 704
F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983), a collateral-source case discussed in Part III below, as
“somewhat analogous”).
See, e.g., N.J. MODEL CIV. JURY CHARGE COMM., MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGE 8.11B, at 3 &
n.1 (2000), https://perma.cc/T8J5-5SEJ (noting that “[a]ny verdict to the plaintiff is
reduced by the percentage” of the whole injury that resulted from the plaintiff ’s failure
to mitigate).
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further reduced it by 13.5% for failure to mitigate.21 Since both comparative
fault and failure to mitigate are percentage reductions, the plaintiff’s recovery
would have been approximately $3 million regardless of sequence.22 Notably,
the Sawicki court, like other courts that have benefitted from this
mathematical property, performed the reductions in the conventionally
problematic order: comparative fault first, then failure to mitigate.23
Is adopting a percentage-reduction system the solution to the sequencing
problem? Unfortunately not. For one thing, percentages are an awkward
method for calculating economic damages. If a plaintiff’s failure to care for his
broken leg results in a secondary infection, then the expenses associated with
the infection should be excluded from recovery. These expenses will involve
specific amounts, not percentages.
For another thing, even with percentage reductions, courts have made
errors due to the confusing nature of percentages (which are always relative to
a particular base value). Take, for example, Strong v. State.24 Although the
damage calculation in Strong involved several liability rather than plaintiff
fault, the issues are ultimately the same. In Strong,
[t]he trial court found that Strong had sustained total damages of $220,499.77. The
court apportioned 50 percent of fault to the [defendant] and 50 percent to [a third
party]. It further reduced the damages by five percent as a result of Strong’s lack
of mitigation efforts. The total award to Strong was $99,224.90.25

So far, the calculation, which involves percentage reductions, appears to be
sequence neutral. Whether one reduces by 50% first or by 5% first does not
matter.
($220k * 50%) * 95% = ($220k * 95%) * 50% = $104.5k
The careful observer, however, will note that this was not the value
reached by the court. Instead, the Strong court apparently measured the 5%
failure to mitigate off of the original damage amount rather than the reduced
amount (in a sense treating it like a specific reduction rather than a percentage
reduction).26
21. No. HHDX07CV020818629S, 2014 WL 7156497, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2014).
22. ($6.9m * 50%) * 86.5% = ($6.9m * 86.5%) * 50% = $2,984,250.
23. See, e.g., Burman v. Fishing Co. of Alaska, No. C10-1130, 2012 WL 2681812, at *4-5

(W.D. Wash. July 6, 2012) (reducing the plaintiff ’s recovery by 25% based on
comparative negligence, and further reducing some damages by 20% for
failure to mitigate).
24. 201 Cal. App. 4th 1439 (2011).
25. Id. at 1448.
26. Another way of characterizing the Strong court’s method is that it effectively added the
percentage reductions: $220,499.77 – ((50% + 5%) * $220,499.77) = $99,224.90. As anyone
who has applied two percentage coupons at the store knows, this is typically
footnote continued on next page

361

Sequencing in Damages
74 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2022)

$220k * 50% = $110k
$110k – ($220k * 5%) = $99k
This reintroduces the sequencing problem. If one calculates mitigation
first and then accounts for several liability, rather than vice versa, one gets a
different (and as we have argued, the correct) answer:
$220k – ($220k * 5%) = $209k
$209k * 50% = $104.5k
Calculation details aside, our fundamental point is that percentages are rife
with opportunities for confusion. Believing that courts can evade the
sequencing problem by using percentage reductions is thus wishful thinking.
Far better would be to have courts understand the sequencing problem and
amend legal doctrine to address it precisely. As is typically the case, mindless
application of formulas or algorithms can spell trouble.
One final point: In our calculations so far, we have (in part for simplicity)
hewn to the common law view that failure to mitigate is the victim’s fault
alone. An alternative view, expressed in the Third Restatement of Torts, is that
failures to mitigate should not be charged exclusively to the victim, since the
need for mitigation arises from the tortious behavior of the injurer.
Accordingly, the Third Restatement suggests that nonmitigated losses too
should be apportioned according to relative fault.27 But even if one accepts the
Third Restatement’s position, the sequencing problem remains. The
comparative-fault analysis and the mitigation analysis concern two separate
acts, so in determining their cumulative effect one must employ a calculation
method that proceeds in some order. Here too sequencing matters, as choosing
the incorrect sequence overcharges the plaintiff.28 Thus, it remains the case
impermissible. A 20% off coupon plus a 25% off coupon does not result in a 45%
discount. One coupon is applied to the already reduced price created by the other. The
order does not matter, but you cannot literally add the percentage reductions.
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 (AM. L. INST. 1999).
Notably, the Third Restatement’s approach seeks to charge victims for less than 100%
of the cost of nonmitigated harm. By contrast, under a typical mistaken sequence,
victims are charged for more than 100%.
28. The Third Restatement provides that a plaintiff ’s failure to mitigate “is a factor to
consider when assigning [overall] percentages of responsibility.” Id. § 3 cmt. b. As noted,
however, a single calculation based on a “combined” percentage would be
inappropriate given the differences between comparative fault and mitigation.
Accordingly, courts following the Third Restatement could either: (1) deduct for the
failure to mitigate first and then for comparative fault; or (2) apply the reverse
sequence. For example, suppose that a victim suffers a harm of $100 that could have
been mitigated to $80. The parties are equally at fault for both the avoidable
component of the harm ($20) and for the nonavoidable component ($80). If the
mitigation doctrine applies first, the victim will be charged $20 * 50% = $10 for the
failure to mitigate, plus $80 * 50% = $40 for comparative fault, arriving at a total of $50.
footnote continued on next page
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that one must account for failures to mitigate before applying comparativefault principles.
II. Damage Caps
For a variety of reasons, legislatures impose caps on certain types of
damages, the most notable and controversial in recent years being caps on
noneconomic damages.29 Damage caps, however, arise in other areas as well.
For example, to protect the public fisc, caps often accompany waivers of
sovereign immunity for tort claims.30 Similarly, some states have capped
damages against certain charitable organizations,31 a compromise between the
complete immunity found under the common law and abolition.32
The interaction of damage caps and comparative fault raises a sequencing
problem. Should a court impose comparative fault before the damage cap, or
the damage cap before comparative fault? Just as in the mitigation context, the
resulting outcomes can be starkly different. Unlike the mitigation context,

29.

30.
31.

32.

By contrast, if comparative fault applies first, the victim will be charged $100 * 50% =
$50 for comparative fault, plus $20 * 50% = $10 for the failure to mitigate, arriving at a
total of $60. The second sequence is clearly erroneous, as it charges the victim for 60%
of the harm even though she is only responsible for 50%.
See, e.g., David M. Studdert, Y. Tony Yang & Michelle M. Mello, Are Damages Caps
Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, HEALTH AFFS., July/Aug.
2004, at 54, 54 (“As a medical malpractice crisis spreads across the United States,
policymakers are responding with reforms aimed at curbing the cost and frequency of
litigation. Caps on damages have emerged as the most common legislative response;
they are also the most controversial.” (footnote omitted)). The constitutionality of
damage-cap statutes varies from state to state, but this is not the focus of our discussion.
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS
§ 486 (West 2021) (discussing arguments and cases).
See, e.g., KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
(FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 6, 31-32 (rev. 2019).
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2021) (limiting the liability of charities to
$20,000 in certain circumstances, and capping medical malpractice claims against
nonprofit healthcare organizations at $100,000).
DeVries v. Habitat for Human., 676 A.2d 152, 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(“Many state courts, including New Jersey’s, developed a common-law charitable
immunity doctrine in the early part of [the twentieth] century. Today, nearly every
state has renounced or severely limited this common-law doctrine. Several states still
grant at least partial immunity to charitable organizations, sometimes through
statute.”), aff ’d per curiam sub nom. DeVries v. Paterson Habitat for Human., 689 A.2d
142 (N.J. 1997). See generally Note, The Quality of Mercy: “Charitable Torts” and Their
Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1987) (discussing the charitableimmunity doctrine).
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however, here the correct sequence depends on the cap’s specific underlying
purpose.33
Consider Collins v. Kentucky Natural Resources & Environmental Protection
Cabinet, a negligence suit against a government agency charged with inspecting
strip mines.34 The Kentucky Board of Claims determined the plaintiff’s
damages to be $958,454, but found the plaintiff to be 80% at fault for the
underlying accident.35 The governing statute imposed a damage cap of
$100,000.36 The Board of Claims imposed the cap before comparative
negligence, resulting in a recovery of $20,000.37 After several appeals, the
Kentucky Supreme Court held the reverse—that comparative fault should
precede the damage cap—resulting in a plaintiff recovery of $100,000.38
On the matter of damage caps, courts have almost unanimously imposed
one sequence: apply comparative fault first, then the damage cap.39 A few
courts have relied on specific textual interpretations to arrive at this
conclusion.40 For example, the Ohio Court of Appeals in Guiliani v. Shehata
focused on the word “recoverable” in the Ohio comparative fault statute, which
requires the court to “diminish the total amount of the compensatory damages

33. See Regent Care Ctr. of San Antonio, L.P. v. Detrick, 567 S.W.3d 752, 770 (Tex. App.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

2018) (“The question here, then, is whether the statutory cap on noneconomic damages
is a limitation on a plaintiff ’s recovery or a limitation on a defendant’s liability.”).
10 S.W.3d 122, 123 (Ky. 1999).
Id. at 124.
Id.
The $958,454 in damages was capped at $100,000, and $100k * 20% = $20k. Id.
$958,454 * 20% = $191,690.80, which was then capped at $100,000. Id. at 124, 127.
Monypeny v. Kheiv, No. W2014-00656-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1541333, at *25 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2015) (“[J]urisdictions that have addressed the interaction between a
damages cap and principles of comparative fault have almost unanimously held that
any reduction or allocation based on comparative fault must be done before applying
the statutory cap . . . .”). For examples, see Guiliani v. Shehata, 19 N.E.3d 971, 978 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2014); McAdory v. Rogers, 264 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (Ct. App. 1989); Brown v. Crown
Equipment Corp., 960 A.2d 1188, 1195 (Me. 2008); Rodriguez v. Cambridge Housing
Authority, 795 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Alhilo v. Kliem, 412 P.3d 902, 915-16
(Colo. App. 2016); Hall v. Brookshire Bros., 848 So. 2d 559, 570-71 (La. 2003); and MahomesVinson v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 913, 924-25 (D. Kan. 1990). We are only aware of one
case in which damage caps were applied first, Gilman v. Beverly California Corp., 231 Cal.
App. 3d 121, 123 (1991). Gilman, however, involved a complicated interplay between
damage caps and liability under Proposition 51, which concerns equity among joint
defendants. Id. at 123, 126-30.
Guiliani, 19 N.E.3d at 979-80 (“Given our review of the language of the statute . . . we
hold that the trial court did not err in applying [comparative fault first].”); Hall, 848 So.
2d at 570-71 (focusing on the word “damages” as opposed to the “amount” that can be
recovered).
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that would have been recoverable by [proportional fault].”41 Yet nearly all
courts have also relied on precedent, legislative purpose, and policy arguments
because the applicable statutory language is invariably ambiguous on the
sequencing question.42
The primary argument for imposing comparative fault first is that damage
caps are motivated by a desire to limit defendant liability, not reduce plaintiff
compensation.43 This argument is best understood in the context of liability
insurance. For example, the preamble of the Florida Tort Reform and
Insurance Act of 1986 states: “[T]here is in Florida a financial crisis in the
liability insurance industry, causing a serious lack of availability of many lines
of commercial liability insurance.”44 Imposing caps allows defendants to
purchase (and insurers to sell) insurance policies with limits sufficient to
protect themselves from liability.45 By this reasoning, one only needs to apply
caps at the end of the damage calculation because the goal is to prevent the
ultimate liability from exceeding the cap (and likely the policy limit).
Courts have also expressed a desire to maximize plaintiff compensation
and honor the role of the jury as factfinder. Both of these goals point toward
applying caps second. The Colorado Court of Appeals argued that if a cap were
applied first, then “the jury’s damages finding in most instances would be
meaningless,”46 presumably because most findings would exceed the cap. The
Tennessee Court of Appeals similarly worried that applying a cap first “would
41. 19 N.E.3d at 977-80 (emphasis omitted) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.35 (West

2014)).
42. See, e.g., Monypeny, 2015 WL 1541333, at *24 (policy); McAdory, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 76

43.

44.

45.
46.

(precedent); Rodriguez, 795 N.E.2d at 9 (precedent); Alhilo, 412 P.3d at 915 (purpose); Hall,
848 So. 2d at 571 (policy). For an example of a statute that leaves sequencing ambiguous,
see FLA. STAT. § 766.207 (2021) (setting a damage cap in matters of medical negligence
without specifying the cap’s underlying purpose).
See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1364-66 (Colo. 1994) (holding that the
purpose of a damage cap statute was to “protect individual defendants from excessive
noneconomic damage verdicts, not to deprive injured plaintiffs from recovering
compensation for their damages”).
Ch. 86-160, pmbl., 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 698; Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1084
(Fla. 1987); see also Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Kan. 2012) (“The legislature
enacted [the cap] in an attempt to reduce and stabilize liability insurance premiums by
eliminating both the difficulty with rate setting due to the unpredictability of
noneconomic damages awards and the possibility of large noneconomic damage
awards.”).
Although one could argue against this analysis, our main point is that certain
interpretative consequences follow from this legislative purpose.
Alhilo, 412 P.3d at 915 (quoting Atkins v. Strayhorn, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1380, 1393 n.8
(1990)). Note, however, that even if comparative fault is applied first, any nuance in the
jury’s determination will still be rendered meaningless if the (reduced) award exceeds
the cap.
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undermine the autonomy of the jury and its role in the trial,”47 and the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court wanted to “honor the jury’s determination.”48 The
California Court of Appeal explained that under comparative fault, “[t]he
plaintiff . . . is already recovering an amount less than the jury determined he
or she was damaged,”49 implying that minimizing the effect of the cap was
preferable.
A final rationale for applying damage caps second is procedural. Since
many statutes imposing caps prohibit the disclosure of those caps to juries
(perhaps due to concerns about anchoring effects),50 courts infer a natural
sequence: The jury determines the damages and apportions them based on
comparative fault, and then the court imposes the statutory cap.51
To be sure, the above rationales are reasonable. Yet once we view the
problem as one of sequencing, we can clearly see an alternative line of
interpretation. What if damage caps are not aimed at limiting a defendant’s
liability directly, but rather at rationalizing noneconomic awards,52 which are
widely acknowledged to be subjective and untethered?53 After all, it is difficult
to ascertain the “worth” of pain in monetary terms.54 Indeed, the preamble to
the Florida Act discussed above offers another justification for damage caps:
“[T]he Legislature desires to provide a rational basis for determining damages
for noneconomic losses which may be awarded in certain civil actions . . . .”55
Under this view, damage caps represent an attempt by the legislature to
define noneconomic damages and their scale. In effect, the legislature is stating
47. Monypeny, 2015 WL 1541333, at *24.
48. Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 960 A.2d 1188, 1195-96 (Me. 2008).
49. McAdory v. Rogers, 264 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75 (Ct. App. 1989). One can also read cases like

50.

51.

52.
53.
54.

55.

McAdory as viewing damage caps as a kind of special-interest legislation that should be
narrowly construed.
E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(6) (2021); see John Campbell, Bernard Chao,
Christopher Robertson & David V. Yokum, Countering the Plaintiff ’s Anchor: Jury
Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543, 546-49 (2016)
(discussing anchoring effects).
Monypeny, 2015 WL 1541333, at *24 (suggesting that since the jury is not allowed to
know about the cap, it must apply comparative fault first); see also Brown, 960 A.2d at
1195 (discussing the jury’s lack of knowledge of the cap).
See supra note 33.
See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 175-76 (2004).
Some economists have tried to quantify pain through so-called “hedonic damages”
calculations, but courts typically reject these efforts. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD
K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY, JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 43:3 (West 2021) (“Most attempts to offer economic experts on the issue
of hedonic damages are also rejected by courts.”).
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, pmbl., 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 699.
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that the most that pain and suffering is worth is, for example, $300,000.56 This
kind of legislative declaration may appear odd, if not a usurpation of the jury’s
role, but in reality it is neither. Legislatures set rational standards (or what they
view to be rational standards) and constrain or displace jury determinations all
the time. For example, a legislature can directly override substantive tort law
by statute, and the doctrine of negligence per se replaces a jury’s individualized
determination of reasonableness with standards set by legislatures or
agencies.57
Based on this “definitional” interpretation, the proper sequence for damage
caps should be the reverse of the dominant rule. The court should impose the
cap first, since the cap defines the limits of the injury. Only then should the
court impose comparative fault. Any concerns about anchoring effects from a
cap-first sequence can be handled by using special verdicts and having the
court perform damage calculations after the jury deliberates.
Unlike with mitigation, our goal for this discussion on damage caps is not
to argue whether the sequence used by courts is right or wrong. Rather, the
correct sequence in this context depends on the purpose underlying the cap.58
If the cap’s purpose is to limit defendant liability, then the prevailing sequence
is correct. If the cap’s purpose is to define the nature and extent of damages
recoverable by plaintiffs, then the current sequence should be reversed.
Compared to noneconomic damage caps, the proper sequence for
government liability caps and charitable-organization caps is more
straightforward. Government liability caps protect the public coffers;
charitable-organization caps protect charitable funds.59 As such, both caps
should be imposed after comparative fault, since they are not aimed at
accurately calculating harm, but rather at limiting an injurer’s liability. In
addition, courts should be wary of unthinkingly using analogies. Just because

56. Cf. Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815-16 (N.Y. 1920) (describing negligence per se as

an exercise of legislative supremacy in defining reasonableness).
57. E.g., Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. 1939) (“At times the indefinite and

flexible standard of care of the traditional reasonably prudent man may be, in the
opinion of the Legislature, an insufficient measure of the care which should be
exercised to guard against a recognized danger . . . .”).
58. See supra note 33.
59. See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text; Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp.,
Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 835 (Mass. 2003) (“The Legislature’s purpose behind the charitable
cap was ‘to protect the funds [and other assets] of charitable institutions so they may be
devoted to charitable purposes.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting English v. New Eng.
Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Mass. 1989))).
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government liability caps should be imposed after comparative fault does not
mean that noneconomic damage caps should be as well.60
III. Collateral Sources
A. The Problem of Collateral Sources
Victims sometimes receive injury-related payments from third parties,
such as the government or private insurers. The presence of these third-party
payors complicates how damages are calculated. Suppose the victim has already
had some medical expenses covered by health insurance, Medicare, or a
personal injury protection (PIP) policy. Or suppose the victim has received
Social Security disability benefits. Can the victim recover those medical
expenses or the value of those disability benefits from the injurer? If so, would
that not constitute double recovery?
The common law permitted such double recovery.61 Historically, the
collateral-source rule made evidence of collateral sources inadmissible,
allowing victims to recover in excess of their actual damages.62 Modern
legislation, however, has largely abolished the collateral-source rule.63 For
example, Florida law states:
In any [tort] action . . . in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant
for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total
of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are
otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources . . . .64

But how—and more importantly, when—should the law account for the
collateral source? As it should be clear by now, whether the court deducts the
collateral source’s value before or after applying comparative fault makes a
difference.

60. Contra Monypeny v. Kheiv, No. W2014-00656-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1541333, at *25-

61.
62.

63.
64.

26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2015) (finding precedent from a case on government liability
caps to be “instructive” for sequencing noneconomic damage caps).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (AM. L. INST. 1979); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION 493-94 (2d ed. 1993).
Bryce Benjet et al., A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: Seeking
Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 210 (2009)
(explaining that the collateral-source rule “prohibits both the reduction of a recovery
by payments from collateral sources and the introduction of evidence of such
payments”).
See generally id. (reviewing modifications to the collateral-source rule).
FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2021) (including in its definition of “collateral sources” Social
Security, disability, and health insurance payments but not workers’ compensation or
Medicare payments).
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To see the implications of sequencing here, consider the following
example. Suppose that (1) the victim’s harm is $100,000; (2) the parties are
equally at fault; and (3) the victim receives $40,000 from a collateral source. If
comparative fault applies first, the harm is divided equally, and then the
collateral-source payment is deducted from the injurer’s liability. This results
in damages of ($100k * 50%) – $40k = $10k. By contrast, if the collateral-source
deduction occurs first, then liability is initially reduced by $40,000, and the
remainder is split according to comparative fault. This approach results in
damages of ($100k – $40k) * 50% = $30k. Thus, the second sequence results in
damages that are three times higher than those obtained in the first.
Such a dilemma arose in Johnson v. United States, a Ninth Circuit case
involving disability benefits under the Veterans Act.65 In Johnson, the plaintiff,
an Air Force sergeant, was paralyzed in a car accident and sued the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.66 The plaintiff suffered over $3.5 million in
damages, but was found to be 25% at fault and was also expected to receive
approximately $1.5 million in Veterans Administration benefits.67 It was “well
settled that recoveries by military personnel ‘under the Tort Claims Act should
be reduced by the amounts paid by the United States as disability payments
under the Veterans Act.’”68 But how should the recovery have been reduced? If
comparative fault were applied first, the plaintiff would have recovered
around $1.125 million.69 If the collateral-source reduction were applied first,
the plaintiff would have recovered around $1.5 million.70 The Ninth Circuit
chose the former option.71
A review of case law on the proper sequencing of collateral sources shows
considerable confusion. For example, Ohio has adopted sequencing rules like
those in Johnson for health benefits under Medicare.72 By contrast, many other
jurisdictions have adopted a collateral-source-first approach. Minnesota has
done so by statute.73 Courts in Florida, Colorado, and Hawaii have done so in
65. 704 F.2d 1431, 1433-34, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 1433.
67. Id. at 1434, 1441.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1441 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 n.* (1954)).
($3.5m * 75%) – $1.5m = $1.125m.
($3.5m – $1.5m) * 75% = $1.5m.
Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1441.
Lamb v. Village of Quincy, 636 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
trial court should “deduct the benefits received by the complainant from insurance or
any other source” after applying comparative fault).
73. MINN. STAT. § 548.251 subdiv. 3(c) (2021) (“In any case where the claimant is found to be
at fault . . . the reduction required [for the collateral source] must be made before the
claimant’s damages are reduced [for comparative fault].”).
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cases involving PIP policies.74 A New York court has done so with Social
Security disability benefits,75 and an Ohio court adopted a collateral-sourcefirst approach in a case involving unspecified insurance benefits.76
B. An Explanation
Close analysis of the above cases and the collateral-source problem itself
provides a clearer picture and some guidance on sequencing.77 The essential
problem with collateral sources is one of distributing windfall. A third party is
providing an additional source of compensation, and the questions are (1) who,
as between the victim and the injurer, should capture the benefits of this
additional source; and (2) to what extent. Under the common law’s collateralsource rule, the victim captured the entire windfall. Abolition of that rule,
however, has allowed courts to consider these distribution questions in more
nuanced ways.
The sequencing of comparative fault and the collateral-source reduction
changes the windfall distribution. Returning to the earlier example, recall that
absent any collateral source, the injurer would be responsible for 50% of the
total harm of $100,000, or $50,000. The collateral source, however, provides an
extra $40,000, and this windfall needs to be distributed. If a court applies
comparative fault before the collateral-source reduction, then the injurer
ultimately pays only $10,000. The windfall is distributed entirely to the injurer
(the opposite of the common law rule). If, on the other hand, the court applies
74. Norman v. Farrow, 880 So. 2d 557, 560-61 (Fla. 2004); Hickenbottom v. Schmidt, 626

P.2d 726, 727 (Colo. App. 1981); Weite v. Momohara, 240 P.3d 899, 922-25 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2010); see also Ganley v. United States, 878 F.2d 1351, 1354 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989)
(applying Florida law prior to Norman); Rivera v. Cincinnati Inc., No. 92-cv-04345,
1998 WL 898128, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1998) (adopting collateral-source reduction
first, but without much explanation).
75. Rodgers v. 72d St. Assocs., 703 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (App. Div. 2000) (“The deduction for
collateral source payments should precede the deduction for comparative fault . . . .”).
76. Sferra v. Shonce, Nos. 90CA51 & 90CA113, 1992 WL 198083, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 1992).
77. As in the damage-cap context, some courts have tried to explain their holdings through
close textual analysis. But once again, the statutory language is almost always
sufficiently ambiguous to support either sequence. For example, the Florida Supreme
Court in Norman v. Farrow focused on language stating that the plaintiff “shall have no
right to recover any damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or
payable.” 880 So. 2d at 559-61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 627.736(3) (2003)).
It then argued that the PIP reduction should precede comparative fault because “[t]hose
amounts are not recoverable.” Id. at 560-61. But one could easily argue for the opposite
sequence based on the same language. The statutory requirement and comparative fault
are two separate grounds for restricting the victim’s damages, and the statute itself
makes no reference to appropriate order. Hence, deducting for comparative fault first
and PIP payments second would not contravene the statute.
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the collateral-source reduction first, then the injurer ultimately pays $30,000.
Now the windfall is distributed between the victim and the injurer.
Specifically, the injurer captures half of the benefit emanating from the
collateral source ($20,000).
To be clear, our definition of “collateral source” does not include instances
in which a third party effectively stands in place of one of the parties. In these
cases, the third party is not a collateral source, and courts have essentially
ignored such third parties in damage calculations. For example, an injurer’s
liability insurer might conceptually be another source of funding, but it
essentially stands in place of the injurer.78 Similarly, a victim’s health insurer,
through standard indemnification and subrogation clauses, essentially stands
in place of the victim.79 Existing statutory schemes recognize this distinction.80
The remainder of our analysis excludes these “privity” or “agency” cases.
With the above insights about windfall distribution, one can tentatively
explain much of the existing precedent. The majority of cases apply the
collateral-source reduction first, reflecting a deep reluctance to distribute the
windfall exclusively to injurers. Most collateral sources involve government
programs intended to benefit the victim (or at least the public at large): Social
Security, Medicare, and so on. Transferring the windfall from these programs
entirely to injurers would seem strange, if not perverse. More natural would be

78. Accordingly, the correct approach in such cases is to apply comparative fault at trial,

and then treat any payment to the victim by the injurer’s insurer as a payment from
the injurer himself. This approach guarantees that the injurer, who acquired the
insurance, fully captures the proceeds when the insured event occurs. For example, if
the harm is $100 and the parties are equally at fault, the injurer is liable for $50. If the
injurer’s liability insurer had already paid the victim $50, however, the injurer should
be absolved from any further liability. This conclusion is consistent with the general
principle set forth in the Second Restatement of Torts: “If a tort defendant makes a
payment toward his tort liability, it of course has the effect of reducing that liability.
This is also true of payments made under an insurance policy that is maintained by the
defendant . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979).
79. In this case, the correct approach is to apply comparative fault at trial, and then treat
any payment from the victim’s insurer as a payment made from the injurer to the
victim. This approach is justified by the fact that the insurer can bring an indemnity or
subrogation claim against the injurer and thus recover the payment from the injurer in
a separate proceeding. A different approach would charge the injurer for more than
100% of the injury (as he would be liable to both the victim and the insurer for the same
harm). The approach described above is also justified from the standpoint of the victim.
By assigning the right of indemnity or subrogation to the insurer, the victim gives up
her right to collect insurance payments in the event of a tort, presumably in exchange
for a lower premium. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS
OF TORT LAW 249-54 (5th ed. 2017) (explaining the rationales behind subrogation and
indemnification).
80. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2021) (“[T]here shall be no reduction for collateral sources for
which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.”).
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to split collateral-source windfalls in some way.81 Even PIP payments, which at
first appear to be personal to the victim (and thus a privity-type case), end up
being split by courts through a collateral-source-first sequence.82 PIPs are often
mandated by states in an effort to reduce litigation surrounding motor-vehicle
accidents,83 and thus they are not intended to benefit the victim alone.
By contrast, many of the comparative-fault-first cases, which allocate the
entire windfall to the injurer, involve harms by the government. These
holdings can be explained by the same principle that motivates government
damage caps: protecting the public coffers. The Ninth Circuit’s Johnson case,
which involved Veterans Administration benefits in a tort suit against the
government, seems to apply this principle.84 Another example is Lamb v.
Village of Quincy, which involved an Ohio sovereign-immunity waiver that
allowed governmental tortfeasors to deduct benefits that plaintiffs were
“entitled to receive . . . from a policy or policies of insurance or any other
source.”85 The Lamb court applied comparative fault first, giving the whole
windfall to the government, because “[f]ailure to follow this procedure [would]
contravene[] the legislative intent . . . to conserve fiscal resources of political
subdivisions.”86
C. Recasting Collateral Sources
Understanding the policy implications of the sequencing rules clarifies and
explains many of the collateral-source cases. The basic question is whether the
81. Indeed, in a rather extreme case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that when the

82.

83.

84.

85.
86.

injurer’s insurer made medical payments to the victim without specifying that they
were related to liability, those payments were to be shared. Jackman v. Jewel Lake
Villa One, 170 P.3d 173, 174-75, 179 (Alaska 2007) (“[I]t hardly follows that an insurer’s
unconditional and unexplained reimbursements of medical expenses should routinely
be treated as having been paid on account of the defendant’s fault.”).
E.g., Norman, 880 So. 2d at 560-61; Hickenbottom v. Schmidt, 626 P.2d 726, 727 (Colo.
App. 1981); Weite v. Momohara, 240 P.3d 899, 923 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010). But see Assi v.
Fla. Auto Auction of Orlando, Inc., 717 So. 2d 588, 589-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(applying comparative fault first in a PIP case), overruled by Norman, 880 So. 2d 557.
See, e.g., Weite, 240 P.3d at 923; HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-301.5 (2021) (providing that
PIP benefits should be deducted from a victim’s compensation); id. § 431:10C-104
(mandating the purchase of PIPs in Hawaii).
Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 65-71 and
accompanying text. While Johnson does not discuss this rationale explicitly, the desire
to protect the public coffers could, at least in part, explain the outcome.
636 N.E.2d 412, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.05(B)
(West 1993)).
Id. at 418. But see Sferra v. Shonce, Nos. 90CA51 & 90CA113, 1992 WL 198083, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1992) (holding that the collateral-source reduction should be
applied first, because “[t]o hold otherwise would provide a political subdivision with a
windfall”).
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windfall should go to the injurer or be divided between the parties. Unless
there is a particular reason to favor the injurer exclusively, courts have opted
to split the windfall and account for the collateral source before applying
comparative fault.
That said, something is still not right. In truth, the fact that the collateralsource-first sequence divides the windfall between the parties is just a
coincidence. Conceptually, the existence of a collateral source has nothing to
do with the joint damages created by the parties. As we have emphasized, the
collateral-source payment is merely a windfall that needs to be allocated.
Worse yet, the collateral-source-first sequence divides the windfall in
perverse ways. Splitting the windfall based on comparative fault means that
the more culpable party captures more of the benefit!
Referring again to our earlier example, we can demonstrate this perverse
result. Recall that the harm is $100,000, the parties bear equal responsibility,
and the third party’s payment is $40,000. As we have seen, if the court deducts
the collateral-source payment first, and then applies comparative fault, the
injurer pays $30,000 in damages. Because the injurer is responsible for 50% of
the harm, he captures half the benefit arising from the collateral source
($20,000).
But what if the injurer were 90% at fault? Then, by the same procedure, his
liability would be ($100k – $40k) * 90% = $54k. Note that, absent the collateral
source, the injurer’s liability would have been $90,000. Hence, the injurer now
captures 90% of the benefit arising from the payment made by the third party:
$90k – ($40k * 90%) = $54k. Thus, paradoxically, the more culpable the injurer,
the greater his share of the windfall.
From these observations, we can draw several conclusions about
collateral-source reductions. Both sequences that courts currently employ
suffer from fundamental weaknesses, though for different reasons. The
comparative-fault-first approach distributes the entire benefit of the collateralsource payment to the injurer, a seemingly inequitable (and possibly perverse)
result. The collateral-source-first approach splits the benefit between the
parties but does so in a manner that rewards the more culpable party. This, too,
seems inequitable and perverse.
Against this backdrop, a third (heretofore overlooked) possibility emerges.
Recall that the collateral sources we have been discussing are unrelated to the
joint damages created by the parties. Courts therefore should not account for
these sources before the imposition of comparative fault. Thus, the correct
sequencing rule should put comparative fault first. Yet to prevent injurers
from capturing the entire windfall, courts should subsequently distribute the
collateral-source payment using a separate analysis.
We propose a novel approach whereby the windfall is distributed
according to the “inverse” of each party’s comparative fault. If a party’s relative
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fault is 90%, that party should receive 10% of the windfall (while the other
party, whose fault is 10%, should receive the remaining 90%). Applying this
principle to our example: If the injurer is 90% at fault for a harm of $100,000,
and the collateral source provides $40,000, after the application of comparative
fault, liability should be reduced by $40k * 10% = $4k, from $90,000 to $86,000.
Basing distribution of the windfall on the inverse of parties’ relative fault
is desirable in terms of both equity and incentives. From an equity perspective,
it correctly allocates financial responsibility in accordance with comparative
negligence. From an incentive perspective, it offers a greater reward to the
party whose behavior is more in line with the applicable standard. In so doing,
this approach better incentivizes both parties to act with optimal care.
Regardless of the exact rule chosen, the above account demonstrates that a
careful analysis of sequencing can provide valuable insights. From the morass
of rules governing collateral sources, we have again distilled that sequencing
matters and can reflect different policy choices. More importantly, we have
demonstrated that the problem of collateral-source payments is not
exclusively a matter of sequencing, but also a matter of designing a distribution
mechanism that addresses concerns of equity and efficiency.
D. An Extension: Settlement Rules
On a final note, our analysis of collateral sources accords well with
settlement rules in cases involving multiple defendants. Conceptually, these
cases are just another variant of the collateral-source problem. The Supreme
Court case of McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde 87 illustrates the issue. In McDermott,
the plaintiff suffered $2.1 million in damages due to a crane accident. A jury
found defendants AmClyde and River Don to be 32% and 38% at fault,
respectively.88 The plaintiff had earlier settled with a different group of
defendants (who, in combination with the plaintiff, were responsible for the
remaining 30% of the harm) for $1 million.89 Note that $1 million
corresponded to almost half the harm, and therefore exceeded the proportional
share of the settling parties’ fault. The question facing the Court was how to
account for the settlement windfall.
There are two principal ways to credit the prior settlement: either
(1) reduce the judgment against the litigating defendants pro tanto by the $1
million prior settlement (ensuring that the victim is made whole and
preventing excessive or inadequate recovery); or (2) reduce the judgment
proportionately by the settling defendants’ 30% share (ensuring that each
87. 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
88. Id. at 204-05.
89. Id. at 205-06.
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defendant pays its relative share and preventing excessive or inadequate
liability). The Supreme Court’s analysis thus focused on this choice between
the pro tanto and proportionate approaches.90 Yet one can easily transform the
question into a collateral-source sequencing problem. Here, the settlement is
the collateral source, and the question becomes how the court should account
for it. The pro tanto method effectively adopts a collateral-source-first
approach. It reduces the damages ($2.1 million) by the settlement ($1 million),
and then divides the remainder by comparative fault. As a result, River Don
would be liable for about $597,000.91
By contrast, the proportionate method effectively adopts a comparativefault-first approach. The damages ($2.1 million) are divided by comparative
fault, resulting in River Don’s liability being $798,000.92 The entire collateralsource payment is then given to the plaintiff. Under this approach, which the
Supreme Court ultimately adopted, the settling defendants’ contributions are
effectively kept in a separate lane. If a settling defendant pays too much, the
plaintiff keeps it; if a settling defendant pays too little, the plaintiff is out of
luck.
By our analysis, McDermott is correct not only as a policy matter but also as
a conceptual matter. The settlement has no bearing on the joint damage caused
by the defendants, so comparative fault should be applied before accounting for
the collateral-source payment. Thereafter, how the windfall (or shortfall)
should be divided becomes a matter of policy. To one view, since the victim
negotiated the settlement, he alone should receive the resulting benefit or bear
the resulting loss. By contrast, policy goals such as the promotion of settlement
may warrant distributing the windfall differently.
IV. Discussion
The preceding Parts have demonstrated the rank confusion among courts
surrounding questions of sequencing. This Part turns to consider three related
90. Id. at 208-17.
91. ($2.1m – $1m) * (38%/70%) = $597,142.86.
92. $2.1m * 38% = $798k. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 210. The court of appeals reached an

erroneous result by either standard. The court, in effect, counted the settlement twice:
It initially found the defendants responsible for only 70% of the harm (thus crediting
them for the 30% attributable to the settling party and the plaintiff); and it then
reduced liability further by deducting the settlement amount of $1 million (thereby
crediting the defendants again for the same parties’ share). Thus, under the court’s
calculation, the remaining liability was determined to be ($2.1m * 70%) – $1m = $470k.
For contractual reasons not relevant here, the court of appeals found that AmClyde
was not liable at all and imposed the $470,000 sum solely on River Don. McDermott,
Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068, 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. McDermott, 511
U.S. 202.
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issues. First, it explores reasons why courts may overlook the importance of
sequencing, which often results in the misallocation of liability. Second, it
sheds light on the social costs of such errors, highlighting their adverse
implications, particularly for vulnerable parties. Finally, it offers a
comprehensive framework for addressing sequencing questions, sketching a
general “algorithm” that can apply across different manifestations of the
sequencing problem.
A. Why Courts Err
If sequencing is so critical to the calculation of damages, why do courts so
often get it wrong, or at least fail to fully account for its implications? In this
Subpart, we offer four possible explanations: (1) an adherence to the
chronological order of events; (2) the elusiveness of functional analogies; (3) a
misguided reliance on conceptual framing; and (4) the ambiguity of legislative
intent. While each of these explanations provides an independent account for
the observed confusion, we suspect that their cumulative effect is what clouds
the vision of courts.
The first explanation for courts’ confusion is the natural tendency to
construct legal analysis (and indeed, any analysis) chronologically. Consider
comparative fault and mitigation. A victim’s negligence (namely, her failure to
take adequate care) precedes her failure to mitigate harm. Hence, it seems
intuitive to examine comparative negligence first and mitigation second.
Unless one is aware of the mathematical and policy implications of alternative
sequences, aligning the “legal sequence” with the “chronological sequence”
seems intuitive and appealing.
A second reason that courts err is the ill-considered use of analogies across
sequencing contexts. Consider two sequencing cases from the Ninth Circuit
that we have already discussed: Gomez v. American Empress Partnership 93 and
Johnson v. United States.94 In deciding how to sequence mitigation in Gomez, the
Ninth Circuit relied in part on an analogy to Johnson, which addressed
sequencing in the collateral-source context.95 Yet as discussed above, the
correct sequencing for collateral sources is inapposite to the correct sequencing
for mitigation. Sequencing in the mitigation context involves the accurate
calculation of joint damages; sequencing in the collateral-source context
93. No. 97-35932, 1999 WL 595330 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1999); see supra notes 14-19 and

accompanying text.
94. 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
95. Gomez, 1999 WL 595330, at *2 & n.7 (“The district judge’s method of calculation, first

reducing total damages by [the plaintiff ’s] percentage of fault, then reducing that
subtotal by the money amount that [the plaintiff] could have avoided by reasonable
mitigation, was consistent with [Johnson, a] somewhat analogous case in our court . . . .”).
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involves the distribution of a windfall. The two problems involve different
conceptual issues and different policy questions.
Courts make a similar mistake when they analogize across different types
of damage caps. Take, for example, Monypeny v. Kheiv, in which the Tennessee
Court of Appeals found precedent on the proper sequence for government
liability caps “instructive” in a case involving noneconomic damage caps.96
While both contexts involve caps, the rationale behind government liability
caps is quite different from the rationale that motivates noneconomic damage
caps. Recall that government liability caps are intended to protect public funds,
whereas noneconomic damage caps may be intended to define or rationalize
the nature of noneconomic injury. Reasoning across the two contexts simply
because they appear similar is traveling a primrose path.
In fairness to courts, the confusion in this context is understandable.
Sequencing cases frequently appear enticingly similar. Yet small changes can
result in the same sequence having markedly different ramifications for a
victim’s compensation. Consider sequencing for mitigation and sequencing for
damage caps. Both involve the ordering of (1) comparative fault; and (2) a rule
reducing the damages award. Yet sequencing plays out differently in each. For
mitigation, applying comparative fault first and mitigation second
shortchanges the victim: It decreases the victim’s compensation as compared to
her recovery under the reverse order. For damage caps, applying comparative
fault first and the cap second increases the victim’s recovery as compared to the
reverse order. In short, getting sequencing right is complicated. It requires an
awareness of the sequencing issue itself and a meticulous dissection of the
underlying context.
Sequencing errors are further exacerbated by their conceptual framing.
Conventionally, tort rules fall into two distinct categories: those governing the
assignment of liability and those determining the scope of damages. While
comparative fault has traditionally been classified as a liability issue, the rules
governing mitigation, damage caps, and collateral sources have been classified
as damages issues.97 Leading torts casebooks often discuss comparative fault in
the “Plaintiff’s Conduct” chapter, whereas they discuss mitigation, damage
caps, and collateral sources in the “Damages” chapter.98 Similarly, remedies
casebooks commonly discuss the latter three doctrines, but they rarely
96. No. W2014-00656-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1541333, at *24-25 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1,

2015).
97. See, e.g., Yehuda Adar, Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Two Sister
Doctrines in Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783, 794 (2013) (“Anglo-American
law treats mitigation and comparative negligence . . . as two utterly distinct legal
institutions . . . [that] have little or nothing to do with each other.”).
98. E.g., EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 4, at 334-52, 807-08, 815-16, 845-50. For more
examples, see Adar, supra note 97, at 795 & nn.45-46.
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mention comparative fault.99 This conceptual separation is perhaps useful for
purposes of organization and presentation, but it has unfortunately taken on a
more formal cast in the courts.100 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for
example, has expressly noted that “[c]omparative negligence is generally
‘viewed as a liability doctrine, rather than a damage doctrine.’”101 The Fifth
Circuit has emphasized that mitigation “is not considered a defense at all, but
merely a rule of damages.”102
This dichotomy between liability and damages can easily seduce courts
into a kind of procedural formalism that then dictates sequence.103 After all,
factfinders are normally supposed to determine liability first and damages
second.104 So, the fallacious argument goes, surely the court should apply
comparative fault (that is, liability) before making “damage adjustments.”
Indeed, in Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., discussed in the Introduction above, the

99. For examples, see Adar, supra note 97, at 795-96, 796 n.47.
100. The dichotomy may have its origins in contributory negligence, which, as a complete

101.

102.

103.

104.

defense to liability, makes sense to resolve at the liability stage. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN
B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 458 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“[C]ontributory negligence is negligence
of the plaintiff before any damage, or any invasion of his rights, has occurred, which
bars all recovery. The rule of [mitigation] comes into play after a legal wrong has
occurred, but while some damages may still be averted, and bars recovery only for such
damages.”); see also, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 783 F.2d 347, 350
(2d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing contributory negligence from failure to mitigate). But the
modern rise of comparative fault, particularly in its “pure” form, has rendered this
conceptual framework anachronistic. See Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C.,
Contributory Negligence/Comparative Fault Laws in All 50 States 2 (2021),
https://perma.cc/9CY5-A4M5 (reporting that only Alabama, the District of Columbia,
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have yet to adopt some form of comparative
negligence).
Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 155 n.5 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Michael B. Gallub, Note,
A Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A Critical Assessment of the Seat
Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 327 (1986)).
Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1474 (5th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Southport Transit Co. v. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., 234 F.2d 947, 952 (5th
Cir. 1956)).
A related, illustrative example is the Sixth Circuit’s holding that when a defendant in a
bifurcated trial fails to plead the victim’s negligence in the liability phase, the pleading
is considered waived and can no longer be raised in the damages phase. Nilson-Newey
& Co. v. Ballou, 839 F.2d 1171, 1175 (6th Cir. 1988) (referencing previous case law for
the view that comparative and contributory negligence should be regarded as relevant
to the issue of “liability rather than to the issue of what the total damage amounted to”).
E.g., Swink v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 83 C 1842, 1985 WL 1478, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
May 22, 1985) (“[B]ecause plaintiff must first prove liability, it is premature to rule on
the question of damages.”).
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Seventh Circuit emphasized its desire to seal off comparative fault from
mitigation in an attempt to simplify the questions asked of the jury.105
As we now know, however, the dichotomy between comparative fault and
the other damages doctrines is false. It is emphatically not the case that
comparative fault is a “liability” inquiry and thus should always be assessed
first. Sometimes it should be assessed first, and sometimes it should not be. It
depends on the context. Allowing the procedural formalism of a “liability
phase” and a “damages phase” to dictate how we calculate damages is
tantamount to the tail wagging the dog. Trial structure does not (or at least
should not) dictate how we calculate damages. It is the need to calculate
damages accurately that should drive how we structure trials.
Finally, legislatures exacerbate the sequencing problem by failing to
provide clear messages about statutory purpose. Is the purpose of noneconomic
damage caps to limit the defendant’s liability or to define the nature of
noneconomic damages? Why have legislatures abolished the common law
collateral-source rule? The answers to these questions affect proper sequencing.
Yet as we saw in the context of the Florida Tort Reform and Insurance Act of
1986, statutes can be vague and broad regarding their purposes, leaving courts
to their own devices.106
One might be tempted to say that legislatures should simply specify the
sequencing rule in the statutory text itself, but such an attempt would probably
be a fool’s errand. There are too many combinations of damage adjustments to
comprehensively account for all of them ex ante. For example, one can easily
imagine a car accident that involves a failure to mitigate, a noneconomic
damage cap, and a collateral source. And that is based only on the examples that
we have discussed. Rather than being rule based, the solution must inevitably
be based on a general algorithm or set of principles. We explore this idea
further in Part IV.C below.
B. The Cost of Erroneous Sequencing
The costs of sequencing mistakes are varied and can be sizable. Most
obviously, incorrect sequencing can carry alarming distributional
105. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit feared that the jury might conflate comparative fault

with mitigation, which could tip the plaintiff ’s “fault” over 50% and bar recovery under
Illinois law. See Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1991). In line
with this reasoning, the court stated that while “the issue of comparative negligence
was appropriately resolved in the liability phase,” the question of whether the
plaintiff ’s “recovery should be reduced because of [the] failure to prevent the
occurrence of avoidable consequences . . . related to the amount of . . . recovery and was
properly addressed in the damages phase.” Id. at 1402.
106. Ch. 86-160, pmbl., 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 698-99 (providing many reasons for imposing
damage caps).
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consequences. As we have seen, the choice of sequence can mean the difference
of hundreds of thousands of dollars for a single plaintiff. The choice of
sequence also determines how collateral-source windfalls, often of considerable
monetary value, are shared between the parties.
In the mitigation context, improper sequencing can exacerbate the
obstacles faced by plaintiffs in idiosyncratic situations, many of whom come
from marginalized groups. As is often the case in torts, the standard for
mitigation is an objective one.107 Members of groups whose preferences or
capabilities do not accord with those of a “reasonable person” thus pay extra,
because their unique attributes can cause them to violate the mitigation
standard. For example, partly due to First Amendment concerns, courts have
held that mitigation does not individualize to account for religious beliefs that
require the refusal of certain medical treatments.108 Victims who hold these
beliefs are effectively penalized for their observance through the reduction of
their award for failure to mitigate.109 If a court uses the improper sequence,
then these tort victims will suffer an even greater economic penalty.110
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“The factors

determining whether an injured person has used care to avert the consequences of a
tort are in general the same as those that determine whether a person has been guilty of
negligent conduct . . . . He is required to exercise no more than reasonable judgment or
fortitude . . . .”).
108. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 574-75 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We conclude that in an
appropriate case, application of the case-by-case approach to religiously motivated
refusals to mitigate damages can involve weighing the reasonableness of religious
beliefs and thus arguably would violate the establishment clause.”); Braverman v.
Granger, 844 N.W.2d 485, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that
individualization on account of religion would result in excessive entanglement);
Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (declining to create an
exception to the reasonable person standard for religious practices).
109. For a broader discussion of the case law, see generally Anne C. Loomis, Comment, Thou
Shalt Take Thy Victim as Thou Findest Him: Religious Conviction as a Pre-existing State Not
Subject to the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 473 (2007).
110. Erroneous sequencing, which inflates the economic penalty imposed on the victim, can
also distort the victim’s incentive to mitigate. If the inflated penalty is sufficiently high,
a victim with idiosyncratic attributes may choose to mitigate even when mitigation is
inefficient. Suppose, for example, that a victim can undertake medical treatment that
would mitigate their harm by $10. The treatment costs $1 for an ordinary victim, but
$11 for a victim belonging to a special group. So long as victims are charged $10 for
failing to mitigate, victims belonging to the special group will (efficiently) bear the
penalty and refrain from mitigating. Yet under an incorrect sequence, such victims
will be charged a higher amount, and may therefore be induced to mitigate
inefficiently. In this example, if the economic penalty exceeds $11, ordinary victims
will mitigate (efficiently) and will not bear the penalty, but victims belonging to the
special group will be driven to mitigate inefficiently to avoid the inflated penalty.
Thus, the combination of an objective standard and an incorrect sequence is
particularly harmful for idiosyncratic victims.
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This penalty enhancement occurs outside of the religious context as well.
For example, citing the objective mitigation standard, courts have penalized
smokers for their failure to stop smoking111 and obese victims for their failure
to reduce their body weight.112 Courts have done so even when victims exerted
effort to meet the mitigation standard but fell short due to subjective
limitations.113 These rules may already seem unfair; applying improper
sequencing makes the situation even worse.114
Aside from these equity concerns, improper sequencing can have
undesirable effects on behavior. In the damage-cap context, improper
sequencing can overdeter potential defendants. This problem is of particular
concern in the context of medical treatment, where caps are prevalent.
Applying the wrong sequence overcharges medical providers,115 resulting in
an inflated cost of medical care and an unnecessary rise in malpractice
premiums. These costs are ultimately borne by the public and are felt most by
the poor, who already face unmanageable healthcare costs.
In the collateral-source context, the adverse impact on behavior is even
more direct. At present, courts (unsurprisingly) prefer the sequencing rule that
divides the collateral source between the parties rather than the rule that
allocates it entirely to the injurer. But as we have demonstrated, the current
rule creates perverse incentives and violates basic fairness by allocating the
windfall in direct proportion to fault. The more culpable party captures more
of the benefit. Courts cannot address issues like this without understanding the
underlying sequencing questions.
The heavy cost of incorrect sequencing highlights the importance of
addressing the sequencing problem. Considering the systematic distortions
that incorrect sequences can produce, one cannot expect that erroneous
decisions will cancel each other out, nor can one hope that other compensation
111. Schifino v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 11-cv-01094, 2013 WL 6533180, at *12-13 (W.D. Pa.
112.

113.
114.

115.

Dec. 13, 2013).
Muller v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 337 F. Supp. 700, 706-07 (E.D. La.), aff ’d, 468 F.2d 951 (5th
Cir. 1972); see also Van Holt v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 669 N.E.2d 1288, 1298-99 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (discussing whether losing weight qualifies as mitigation).
See, e.g., Muller, 337 F. Supp. at 706-07 (reducing compensation despite the plaintiff ’s
past attempts to lose weight).
As in the religious context, victims facing the higher penalty can do one of two things.
They can either fail to mitigate, resulting in an even higher penalty for their
idiosyncratic position, or they can mitigate based on the enhanced price, and in doing
so suffer more harm than necessary. Although they may capture the economic benefit
of mitigating, they must endure the personal, emotional, or other noneconomic harms
that led them to refuse mitigation in the first place.
As discussed in Part II above, when caps are set to reflect the upper bound of the harm,
application of the wrong sequence (namely, comparative fault first and the cap second)
results in excessive liability.
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rules will somehow counter sequencing errors. In the next Subpart we consider
a possible approach to address the problem of sequencing.
C. Developing a General Theory
Throughout this Article, we have stressed that sequencing matters, and
that courts frequently get sequencing wrong. We have also seen, however, that
determining the correct sequence can be extremely complicated and can
depend significantly on context. Just from our three examples, we find three
different conclusions. In the mitigation context, courts should apply
mitigation reductions first. In the damage-cap context, the sequence depends
on the underlying policy of the cap. If the cap aims to limit the defendant’s
liability, then courts should apply comparative fault first; if the cap aims to
define the plaintiff’s injury, then courts should apply the cap first. In the
collateral-source context, except for special circumstances involving
governmental actors,116 courts should apply neither existing sequence. Instead,
they should apply comparative fault first and then divide the collateral source
by the inverse of fault.
Is there a theory or algorithm we can derive from this disarray to help
courts navigate the problem of sequencing? After all, while individual
solutions may be well and good, a more general solution would be more ideal.
We think that such a solution exists. Careful attention to the procedure we
outline below will help courts determine the correct sequencing approach
regardless of context.
Step 1: Determine the damages jointly caused by the parties.
The first step is to calculate the damages that were jointly caused by the
parties. The key word here is “jointly.” Mitigation comes first because
avoidable consequences are not jointly caused: They are the plaintiff’s
responsibility alone and should therefore be kept separate from the
comparative-fault calculation. Similarly, if the purpose of a damage cap is to
delineate the boundaries of the plaintiff’s recovery, then the cap should be
imposed before comparative fault, because it effectively defines joint damages.
This principle also explains why courts should not account for collateral
sources before comparative fault. Collateral sources are windfalls created by
third parties which have no bearing on the joint harm caused by the parties
themselves. We defer their accounting until later.

116. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
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Step 2: Apply comparative fault.
With the joint damages ascertained, it is time to impose comparative fault.
The court divides the jointly caused damages between the parties
proportionally based on fault.
Step 3: Apply doctrines that deal with individual or distributive issues.
With the damages split between the victim and the injurer, the court can
apply doctrines that affect each party individually. For example, if a damage
cap’s purpose is to limit the injurer’s liability, the court should apply it here to
cap what the injurer individually must pay. This is also the correct time to
distribute collateral sources, based on whatever distributional scheme the court
chooses. Under our proposal, the court would in most cases divide the
collateral-source windfall by inverse comparative fault and credit the parties
accordingly.
Notably, the pivot of our sequencing framework is comparative fault.
Doctrines that pertain to joint damages are applied before comparative fault,
and doctrines that pertain to individual damages are applied after. To
understand why comparative fault is the pivot, we need to go back to the order
of operations. Comparative fault is a multiplicative operation, while nearly all
other damages doctrines are additive (or subtractive).117 That is ultimately the
key to why sequencing matters. Typically, damages doctrines can be applied in
any sequence because addition is commutative and associative: Addition
calculations can be shuffled without ill effects. But multiplication cannot be
shuffled with addition. That is why the lone multiplicative operation,
comparative fault, becomes the axis on which sequencing turns. Some addition
must be done before comparative fault and some addition must be done after,
but never should the twain mix.118

117. As noted, even when the failure to mitigate is expressed in terms of percentage

reductions, a sequencing problem can arise if courts apply incorrect calculations like
the one in Strong. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
118. While the pervasiveness of comparative fault will surely make it the primary pivot,
damage caps by themselves can create a similar dynamic. Damage caps are ceiling
functions, and therefore are sensitive to the sequencing that occurs around them. For
example, sequence would matter in a case involving damage caps and collateral sources
alone. Suppose the victim suffers $300,000 in injuries, there is a $250,000 cap, and the
victim received $50,000 from a collateral source. Suppose also that the injurer retains
the entire collateral-source windfall. If the cap is applied first, the victim will receive
$250k – $50k = $200k. If the collateral-source reduction is applied first, the victim will
receive $300k – $50k = $250k.
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Conclusion
This Article has explored sequencing in three distinct areas of torts—
mitigation, damage caps, and collateral sources—all of which play a major role
in determining liability and compensation. As we have seen, the existing case
law on sequencing is haphazard and undertheorized. Courts frequently
disagree on the correct sequence, impose the wrong sequence, or fail to
recognize the sequencing problem entirely. Occasionally, courts also analogize
inappropriately across contexts and allow the structure of the trial to dictate
the sequence of damages.
As we have noted, however, much of the confusion is understandable. For
one thing, no one seems to have identified sequencing as a general problem. On
this score, developing a broad, unified approach to sequencing is an advance in
and of itself. For another thing, proper sequencing is hard. The right answer
changes sharply depending on context and policy considerations, and two
sequencing questions that appear similar may be quite different. We have seen
instances in which sequencing should be one way, others in which sequencing
should be the exact opposite, others in which it depends, and still others in
which the two obvious possibilities are both wrong.
As difficult as sequencing may be, we have emphasized time and again that
it matters. Getting sequencing right is not just an academic exercise. Doing so
has substantial implications for victim recovery, distributional fairness, and
behavioral incentives. This Article has not only highlighted sequencing as an
area worthy of future study but has also provided some important real-world
solutions. It has offered the correct sequences for failures to mitigate, damage
caps, and collateral sources. Perhaps more importantly, it has offered a general
framework, allowing for a more systematic analysis of sequencing problems
going forward.
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